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Abstract We present a model describing the temporal evolution of opinions due
to interactions among a network of individuals. This Accept-Shift-Constrict (ASC)
model is formulated in terms of coupled nonlinear differential equations for opinions
and uncertainties. The ASC model dynamics allows for the emergence and persis-
tence of majority positions so that the mean opinion can shift even for a symmetric
network. The model also formulates a distinction between opinion and rhetoric in
accordance with a recently proposed theory of the group polarization effect. This
enables the modeling of discussion-induced shifts toward the extreme without the
typical modeling assumption of greater resistance to persuasion among extremists.
An experiment is described in which triads engaged in online discussion. Simula-
tions show that the ASC model is in qualitative and quantitative agreement with the
experimental data.
1 Introduction
While the experimental study of social influence and opinion change in particular
primarily remains the province of the social sciences, the modeling of social influ-
ence dynamics, however, has extended into other fields including physics, computer
science, and electrical engineering [1, 2, 3]. The primary goal of opinion network
models is to predict final opinions from initial ones typically via a process that
updates node opinions over time. Continuous opinion models — the concern of
this paper — allow for incremental shifts in opinion where the amount of change
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depends upon the distance between node opinions and the network of interpersonal
influence that couples nodes. The DeGroot and Friedkin-Johnsen models, as well
as the consensus protocol (a continuous time version of the DeGroot model), use a
linear dependence in which the shift is proportional to the opinion difference [4, 5, 6].
Bounded confidence models posit a hard opinion difference threshold, within which
nodes interact linearly, but beyond which the interaction vanishes [7]. The nonlinear
model of [8] uses a soft threshold so that, rather than vanishing completely, the
interaction decays smoothly with distance.
Modeling how opinions become more extreme has been of particular concern
in the opinion network modeling literature. The primary contribution of this paper
is to present an opinion network model, the Accept-Shift-Constrict (ASC) model,
which provides an experimentally supported depiction of the group polarization
effect, a classic social psychology effect in which discussion among like-minded
group members tends to make groups more extreme. The ASC model describes
opinion change processes over a network as group members exchange messages.
These processes consist of, first, the acceptance of a persuasive message which can
then lead to a shift in the receiver’s opinion and also a constriction of the receiver’s
uncertainty level. In turn, this constriction narrows the extent to which subsequent
messages advocating distant opinions are accepted.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the group polarization
effect alongwith its treatment in social psychology and the opinion networkmodeling
literature. Section 3 describes a recent experiment involving discussion about betting
on National Football League (NFL) games, the results of which challenge existing
group polarization theory. In Sec. 4, an alternative frame-induced theory of group
polarization is presented that can account for the experimental results. Sections 5
and 6 present the ASC model and experimentally-relevant simulation results.
2 Group Polarization Effect
In the group polarization effect, discussion among group members who are all on
the same side of an issue induces more extreme decisions or opinions (“polariza-
tion” as used here connotes a group shifting further toward one pole of an issue
rather than diverging toward opposite poles as in conventional usage) [9, 10, 11].
It was originally referred to as the “risky shift” effect as it was discovered in an
experimental context involving small groups faced with choosing among options of
varying risk levels; discussion tended to shift groups toward riskier options than
the average of their pre-discussion preferences. Subsequent research observed sys-
tematic discussion-induced extremism in homogeneous groups in broader contexts
including social and political attitudes and the severity of punishments in jury de-
liberations. A group is considered to be homogeneous with respect to an issue if
all its members have initial preferences that lie on one side of the issue’s neutral
reference point. Group polarization is then said to occur if after the discussion the
mean preference of the group shifts further away from the reference point compared
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with the mean prior to discussion. Polarization is typically observed for issues that
have a substantial judgmental component as opposed to issues like math problems
that have demonstrably correct solutions.
Two distinct processes, based on informational and normative influence respec-
tively, are most commonly accepted in social psychology as causes of group po-
larization [9, 10]. The informational influence explanation, known as persuasive
arguments theory, focuses on the role of novel arguments. In essence, members of
a homogeneous group, although inclined toward the same side of an issue, will
typically possess different arguments in support of that side. The exchange of these
arguments in discussion then exposes group members to even more information
supporting their initial inclination and so shifts it further in the same direction.
The normative influence explanation, social comparison theory, posits that the re-
lationship of group member positions with respect to a culturally salient norm is
critical rather than the information underlying those positions. The norm is taken to
favor one pole of the issue. For example, a norm favoring risk-taking makes riskier
positions more socially ideal than cautious ones. A major problem of the informa-
tional and normative influence theories is that they always predict polarization for
an individual group whenever the polarization preconditions (homogeneous group
and judgmental issue) are present, regardless of the distribution of initial opinions
within the group. This problem stems from the fact that these theories were never
reconciled with stronger, concurrent social influence phenomena such as majority
influence and consensus pressure [12].
Within the opinion network modeling literature, extremism has been predomi-
nantly modeled by attributing higher network weights to nodes with more extreme
initial opinions [13, 14]. This approach, which we refer to as “extremist-tilting,”
is necessitated by the property of most continuous opinion models that the mean
opinion in networks with symmetric coupling remains constant at its initial value
— a property that is at odds with the shift in mean exhibited in group polarization.
Consequently, extremists must be assigned greater influence over moderates than
vice versa in order to shift the mean. This explanation is different from the two
more prominent theories above but shares their problem of uniformly predicting
polarization for homogeneous groups.
3 Experiment
This section describes the group polarization experiment conducted in [12] in which
three-person groups engaged in online discussion about wagering on National Foot-
ball League (NFL) games. As is standard practice in NFL betting, spread betting was
employed rather than wagering directly on which team will win the game. In spread
betting, the terms “favorite” and “underdog” refer, respectively, to the likely winner
and loser of the game itself. The point spread is the expected margin of victory of the
favorite team as set by Las Vegas oddsmakers. A bet on the favorite is successful if its
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margin of victory exceeds the spread; otherwise a bet on the underdog is successful.1
If Team A is the favorite by a spread of six points over the underdog Team B, then
Team A has to win the game by more than six points in order for a bet on Team A to
pay off. The objective of the spread is to endeavor to equalize the odds for either the
favorite or underdog to win the bet.
In the experiment, an upcoming NFL game was chosen and a pre-survey then
elicited subject initial preferences with respect to team choice and a wager amount on
that team from $0 to $7 (in whole-dollar increments). On the basis of the pre-survey,
discussion groups were constructed with respect to three dichotomous variables.
The first is policy side of favorite or underdog corresponding to the team chosen as
more likely to beat the spread. This variable imposes the polarization precondition
of having like-minded group members as the groups are homogeneous with respect
to the fundamental policy question of which team will win the bet. The second
variable is disagreement level of “high” or “low” that depends upon the difference
between the minimum and maximum wagers in the group. Each group consisted of
low, intermediate, and high wager individuals with respective wagers w1, w2, and
w3. In all groups, the intermediate wager was set so that w2 ∈ {$3, $4}. In the high
disagreement condition, w1 = $0 and w3 = $7 giving a difference of $7. In the low
disagreement condition w1 ∈ {$1, $2} and w3 ∈ {$5, $6} so that the difference could
be $3, $4, or $5. The third variable is network structure of “complete” in which all
members could communicate with each other or “chain” in which the intermediate
wager member w2 served as the center node connecting w1 and w3. After discussion,
each member made their final wager. A group decision was not required but groups
arrived at a consensus wager far more often than the alternative outcomes of a two-
person majority or three different wagers. A winning (losing) bet resulted in a payoff
of $7 plus (minus) the wager, which was donated to a charity.
Polarization, or more specifically a risky shift, is observed for a group if its mean
wager after discussion is greater than its initial mean wager. Most of the 198 groups
reached a consensus wager. For these 169 consensus groups, statistically significant
results were observed for all three of the manipulated variables. For policy side,
only the favorite side exhibited a risky shift whereas the underdog side did not. For
disagreement level, restricted to favorite groups (as underdog groups showed no
systematic risky shift), high disagreement groups exhibited a greater risky shift than
low disagreement groups. For network structure, similarly restricted to favorites,
complete networks showed a greater risky shift than chains. All three of these
behaviors can be seen in Fig. 1 in which substantial polarization is observed when
the error interval is above the initial mean.
The above results are not readily explained by standard polarization theory. Par-
ticularly challenging is the policy side result as standard theory predicts that both
policy sides should show a risky shift. For persuasive arguments theory, members
of both the favorite and underdog groups presumably possess novel information
in support of their team choice and should therefore increase their confidence and
wager. For social comparison theory, a norm toward risk taking should cause both
1 In actual practice, bets are returned if the victory margin equals the spread.
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Fig. 1 Observed and simulated mean consensus wagers as function of initial wager difference,
w3 − w1. (a) Complete network. (b) Chain network. Favorite groups shown on the positive x
axis, underdogs on the negative. Observed consensus is average of final consensus wager (taken as
positive for both favorites and underdogs) over groups at each difference value (no $5 difference
groups were used as there were only four total). Also shown is average of the group mean initial
wager. Experimental data shown as circles. Error bars are standard errors. χ2 value is the sum of
the squared errors between the simulated and the experimental values normalized by the standard
error at each data point. Simulation parameters: α = 0.034, λ(0) = 0.03, λmin = 0.01.
sides to increase their wager. The extremist-tilting explanation prevalent in opinion
network modeling also fails to explain this differential polarization by policy side: if
individuals with more extreme wagers are taken to be more confident and persuasive,
then both favorite and underdog groups should display an equal tendency to increase
their wagers.
4 Frame-Induced Polarization Theory
Reference [12] proposes a novel theoretical mechanism for group polarization that
explains the results of the experiment. Central to the proposed mechanism is the
distinction between the quantitative policy under debate and the rhetorical frame—
the aspect of the policy upon which deliberations focus. The rhetorical frame will
typically correspond to the dominant source of disagreement within the group due,
for instance, to uncertainty as to the likelihood of an outcome. In a binary gamble
such as in the experiment, the policy (e.g. wager amount) on a given outcome (e.g.
team) and the rhetorical frame should be the subjective probability that that outcome
will occur (e.g. win against the spread). The rhetorical frame position ρ(x) is taken
to be a function of the policy x. Groups will tend to shift toward the extreme if
the functional relationship between the rhetorical position and the policy is concave
(ρ′′ < 0), that is, the rhetorical position increases more slowly as the policy becomes
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more extreme. For the experiment, such a concave relationship is expected between
the subjective probability that a subject’s chosen team will win against the spread
and the wager amount (see Sec. 6).
The effect of concavity is to compress rhetorical distances toward the extreme
relative to the distances between more moderate members, making it easier for
majorities to form on the extreme side of the mean. Consequently, while the policy
distribution may be symmetric so that no majority is favored on either side of the
mean (as is approximately the case in our experiment), the distribution of rhetorical
positions is skewed so that there is an initial majority on the extreme side of the
rhetorical mean. This rhetorically-proximate majority (RPM) converges to a policy
position more extreme than the mean to which the moderate minority of group
members (those with policies below the mean) then concur, thereby resulting in
a consensus policy that exhibits group polarization. The members of the F group
(analogous to the favorite groups) in Fig. 2 provide an example of this mechanism.
Although the intermediate member F2 is equidistant in policy from the moderate F1
and the extremist F3, F2 is rhetorically closer to F3 and therefore (F2, F3) is the RPM
pair. They agree on a policy halfway between them to which F1 comes up due to
majority influence. The RPM policy (b) is seen to be greater than the initial mean
policy (a).
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Fig. 2 Effect of rhetorical function concavity and offset reference.ρ(x) = 1/(1 + e−β(x−x0)) with
β = 0.13, x0 = −5. Short lines at bottom show alternative F group consensus policies: (a) mean
policy x¯ = x2; (b) RPM policy x¯23 = (x2 + x3)/2. ASC model acceptance functions in gray.
Although the concavity of the rhetorical function explains the basic group polar-
ization effect, it cannot by itself account for unequal polarization on opposing policy
sides as observed in the experiment. Capturing this differential polarization involves
the freedom of the rhetorical function to have a different reference point than the
policy. The policy reference is defined as the neutral point, taken to be x = 0, that
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demarcates opposing policy sides. The rhetorical reference is defined as the policy
value that maps to the neutral point of the rhetorical frame. For a proper frame, the
rhetorical reference is the same as the policy reference so that the pro and con policy
sides coincide with the pro and con rhetorical sides. For an improper frame, the
rhetorical and policy references are offset so that the rhetorical reference splits one
of the policy sides. Figure 2 shows how an improper frame can lead to differential
polarization by policy side. The rhetorical reference splits the con (negative) policy
side, which results in theU group (analogous to underdog groups) being arrayed on
the approximately linear part of the rhetorical function rather than on the shoulder
as for the F group. Consequently, U2 is roughly the same rhetorical distance from
both U1 and U3. Considering the effects of uncertainty and noise, formation of the
moderate (U1,U2) RPM pair is about as likely as the extreme (U2,U3) pair so that
systematic group polarization is absent or much reduced as observed in the exper-
iment for the underdog groups. An improper frame can result from the heuristic
substitution of a simpler, intuitive frame in place of a more complex proper frame
that directly corresponds to the policy [12]. In the experiment, the heuristic frame
of which team will win the game replaces the proper frame of who will win against
the spread.
5 Accept-Shift-Constrict Model
The ASC model evolves both the positions and uncertainties of group members in
response to their dyadic interactions. We consider position first, which can be a
policy or, more generally, an opinion about some matter. A persuasive message sent
by one group member to another must first be accepted by the recipient in order to
shift their policy.While a number of factors can affect whether amessage is accepted,
the distance between the message’s rhetorical position and that of the receiver plays
the key role in our model: if the distance is within the latitude of acceptance (LOA),
the message is likely to be accepted, but the acceptance probability rapidly decays
beyond the LOA. If the message is accepted, then the receiver’s policy is shifted in
proportion to its distance from the sender’s policy.
Formally, we encode the above process as an ordinary differential equation for
xi(t), the policy position of the ith group member at time t. For a group with N
members, the rate of change of xi is given by
dxi
dt
=
N∑
j=1
νi j(xj − xi) exp
{
−1
2
(ρ(xj) − ρ(xi))2
λ2i
}
, (1)
where νi j is the coupling strength from j → i and λi is i’s LOA. The matrix formed
by the coupling strengths defines a position-independent network of influence. In
general, νi j depends on communication rate and other factors such as credibility and
expertise (νii = 0).
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The linear xj − xi term in Eq. (1) represents the shift effect. The gaussian term
represents the acceptance process and we refer to it as the acceptance function,
a(∆ρ, λ) = e−∆ρ2/2λ2 . Although the acceptance function is always symmetric with
respect to the sign of the rhetorical difference, a(−∆ρ) = a(∆ρ), a concave ρ(x) can
causes it to appear asymmetric along the policy axis as clearly seen for F2 and F3 in
Fig. 2.
In addition to position change, communication can also affect a person’s un-
certainty regarding their position. Group discussion has been observed to increase
the level of certainty that members have in their quantitative judgments [15]. Ac-
cordingly, we introduce an uncertainty reduction mechanism in our model in which
messages from those with similar positions constrict an individual’s LOA so that
they become more resistant to persuasion from distant positions. Messages originat-
ing within the LOA that are accepted decrease the LOA, but not beneath a certain
minimum value λmin. This yields for the LOA dynamics:
dλi
dt
=
{∑N
j=1 νi j(λmin − λi)e−∆ρ
2
i j /2λ2i , |∆ρi j | ≤ λi
0, |∆ρi j | > λi .
(2)
Equations (1) and (2) comprise the ASC model. Assuming no difference between
rhetorical and policy positions, i.e, ρ(x) = x, Eq. (1) is equivalent to the model of
[8] without the self-influence force that models a persistent effect of an individual’s
initial opinion. The uncertainty reduction dynamics represented by Eq. (2) is novel
in opinion network modeling. The model of [13] includes a dyadic uncertainty
interaction that results in uncertainty change only when dyad members have different
uncertainties; this requires that uncertainty levels be visible to other group members,
an assumption not present in Eq. (2), and does not allow equally uncertain individuals
to mutually reinforce their opinions.
A crucial consequence of the uncertainty reduction dynamics in the ASC model
is the ability for interim majorities to more effectively maintain their position in
the face of minority influence. This effect is essential to the RPM process in the
theoretical account of group polarization above but it occurs regardless of whether
or not the rhetorical function is different from the policy. Figure 3a illustrates the
rough persistence of the majority position for a complete-network triad in which
the intermediate member’s position is taken to be halfway between the others. For
sufficiently low initial disagreement, however, an interim majority will not form and
the group equilibrium will be close to its initial mean (Fig. 3b).2
2 The persistence of majority positions on a continuous opinion axis is also found in the agent-based
model of [16], which employs a confidence variable that must be transmitted between agents along
with opinions, rather than the ASC model’s use of an uncertainty interval not visible to others.
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Fig. 3 Position and LOA trajectories in ASC model for a complete network. Solid curves show
policy positions, dashed curves show LOAs. (a) High initial policy disagreement (x3 − x1 = 10)
showing substantial shift between consensus and initial mean policy (x2(0)). (b) Lower initial
policy disagreement (7) results in near simultaneous convergence close to initial policy mean.
λ1,2,3(0) = 0.05, λmin = 0.025; ρ(x) as in Fig. 2.
6 Simulation of Group Polarization
This section demonstrates the ability of the ASC model to produce the same qual-
itative effects as in the frame-induced polarization theory and as observed experi-
mentally. Going beyond qualitative correspondence, its agreement with the data on
a quantitative level is also shown. First, we discuss how the coupling strengths νi j
are set. They are treated as dyadic communication rates as determined by simple
topological considerations. For a complete network, on average, the communication
rates are expected to be the same for all nodes, so we set νi j = 1/2 for all three
dyads. For the chain, if the sequence in which nodes send messages follows the
chain path and the center node (node 2) predominantly opts to send its messages
simultaneously to both outer nodes (rather than separately), then we expect node 2 to
have about twice the communication rate with each of nodes 1 and 3. We therefore
set ν12 = ν32 = 1 and ν21 = ν23 = 1/2.3 These communication rate expectations are
approximately borne out in our experiment.
Figure 4 displays simulation results for complete and chain network triads that are
homogeneous with respect to policy side analogous to the experimental setup. The
baseline case (dotted curve) consists of an intermediate node with an initial policy
x2(0) halfway between the initial positions of the moderate x1(0) and the extremist
3 The sum of the communication weights is normalized to the same (arbitrary) value of 3 in both
networks, a value that only affects the transient time and not the final equilibrium.
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x3(0). The other cases shown (light gray curves) account for position uncertainty
by allowing x2(0) to deviate by various small amounts from the baseline case. The
discussion-induced shift in the mean is plotted against the initial policy difference
between the extremist and the moderate, where the opposing pro and con policy
sides are shown on the positive and negative sides of the horizontal axis respectively.
For the pro (con) side, a positive (negative) polarization shift indicates a shift toward
the extreme — a higher wager in the case of the experiment. The mean over all the
cases (solid dark curve) can be used to gauge the extent of systematic polarization.
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Fig. 4 ASC simulations for triad networks with variability in intermediate node policy. ρ(x) taken
as in Fig. 2. Top row shows proper rhetorical frame (x0 = 0). Bottom row shows improper rhetorical
frame (x0 = −5). Positive and negative policy sides are on positive and negative horizontal axis
respectively. Polarization shift, δ = x¯(t f )− x¯(0), plotted as a function of the initial policy difference,
∆ = x3(0)− x1(0). Shift toward the extreme corresponds to δ > 0 for positive policy side and δ < 0
for negative side. The position of the intermediate node was varied according to x2(0) = ±(6 +  )
for the positive and negative policy sides, where  takes on 41 uniformly-spaced values over the
interval [−1, 1]. x1(0) = 6 − ∆/2 and x3(0) = 6 + ∆/2 for ∆ > 0 and analogously for ∆ < 0. ASC
mean (black) taken over all  values. Shifts for individual  values shown as gray curves. Dotted
curve shows  = 0 baseline case where x2(0) = 6. Gap in the curves is the region where x2(0)
would go beyond x1(0) or x3(0). ASC model parameters: λ1,2,3(0) = 0.05, λmin = 0.025.
The top row of Fig. 4 represents a proper rhetorical frame in which the pol-
icy and rhetorical references are coincident. In the experiment, the proper frame is
the subjective probability of the favorite winning against the spread. The rhetorical
Opinion Network Modeling and Experiment 11
function is taken to be concave with increasing policy extremity.4 Regarding the
mean, both policy sides exhibit equal polarization that increases with disagreement
level and with the complete network showing more polarization than the chain.
Considering higher disagreement levels, the mean polarizes less than the baseline
case because some groups actually depolarize — those in which the moderate and
intermediate node are sufficiently close to overcome the skewing effect of the rhetor-
ical function. This ability to predict depolarization for individual groups despite
the dominant tendency toward polarization is an important capability not present
in the informational, normative, or extremist-tilting theories. Although the proper
frame does exhibit polarization, accounting for the differential polarization by policy
side observed experimentally requires use of an improper frame as is the subjective
probability that the favorite will win the game. The bottom row of Fig. 4 employs an
improper frame and indeed shows substantial polarization for positive policies and
little for negative ones.
The ASC model can also be quantitatively tested against the data. Groups can
be simulated using their actual initial wagers and with the communication weights
as set above. The rhetorical function ρ(w) that maps the wager to the subjective
probability of a favorite game victory (the improper frame) is derived in [12] based
on the theory of individual decision making under risk and uncertainty. It depends
upon the subjective probability p(w) of a favorite victory (the proper frame)
p(w) = 1
2
− 1
8αw
± 1
2
√
1 +
1
16α2w2
, (3)
where the + (−) sign implies bets on the favorite (underdog). The free parameter α
is the risk aversion that quantifies how sensitive individuals are to variance around
the expected value of the payoff. It is assumed to be identical for all subjects. The
rhetorical function is then given by
ρ(w) = 1
2
erfc
{
erfc−1 (2p(w)) − s0
σ
√
2
}
, (4)
where erfc(u) = 2√
pi
∫ ∞
u
e−v2dv. The parameter s0 is the point spread for the game in
question and σ = 12.8 is the empirical standard deviation for the margin of victory
in NFL games. Both p(w) and ρ(w) are S-shaped implying a concave relationship
between the subjective probability of the outcome estimated as more likely and the
wager magnitude.
In addition to the risk aversion, there are two free parameters from the ASC
model that need to be fit from the data, the initial LOA λ(0) and the minimum LOA
λmin, both assumed identical for all subjects. The three parameters are estimated
by minimizing the sum of χ2 error values over both complete and chain networks.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 1. A three-parameter χ2 goodness-of-fit
4 If the subjective probability of one of the binary outcomes is taken as the rhetorical frame and
opposing policy sides have opposite signs, then concavity with increasing policy extremity yields
an overall S-shaped rhetorical function as explained in [12].
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test, which takes as its null hypothesis that the model is correct, yields a probability
Q = 0.33 that χ2 could have exceeded its observed value of 10.2 by chance. With a
conservative threshold of Q < 0.2 for rejecting the null hypothesis, the ASC model
is found to be consistent with the data.
7 Conclusion
The ASC model presented here describes a dual process of opinion and uncertainty
change based on the greater acceptance rate of messages within one’s LOA and the
decrease in LOA due to exposure to similar views. A key dynamic in the model
is the ability of proximate majorities to form and persist for symmetric networks,
thereby enabling majorities to exert outsized influence and produce a consensus
opinion different from the initial mean. Importantly, the ASC model does not in-
volve the exchange of uncertainties over the network unlike other models in which
uncertainties are directly coupled along with opinions [13, 16]. Another important
innovation of the ASC model is the conceptualization of distinct dimensions of
opinion and rhetoric: opinion is an evaluation directly tied to a decision or other
behavioral outcome of interest while rhetoric determines whether messages aimed
at shifting opinions are found persuasive. If the rhetorical function mapping opinion
to rhetorical position is concave, then proximate majority formation at the extreme is
facilitated. Consequently, the ASCmodel can generate systematic group polarization
due to the structure of the decision space rather than by assuming an asymmetric
network structure in which influence is associated with extremity as typically done
in opinion network modeling. The ASC model simulations shown here display the
same qualitative phenomena as observed in the experiment: polarization on one
policy side but not the other, increasing polarization with disagreement level, and
greater polarization for complete networks than for chains. Furthermore, the ASC
model is in quantitative agreement with the experimental data.
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